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Abstract 
 
Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the ‘mouthpiece’ of the 
Provisional IRA to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party 
continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition 
of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to 
Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also 
plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of 
the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, 
more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition 
and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been 
accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that 
is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a 
political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the 
pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of 
electoral competition and driven by office seeking priorities. In order to explore 
Sinn Féin within the modern political arena this paper firstly examines the 
broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into 
constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the 
basis of Sinn Féin’s electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents from the 
1970s onwards are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy and 
professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have 
completed the transition from being a ‘mouthpiece’ to their armed counter-part, 
towards being a ‘normal’ political party. 
 
Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a ‘normal’ political 
party? 
 
[The objectives of Sinn Féin are to] Bring the Proclamation of the Republic 
of Easter 1916 into effective operation and to establish the Republic, 
representative of the people of Ireland, based on that Proclamation. (Sinn 
Féin Bunreacht Agus Rialacha/Constitution and Rules)1  
 
As of 2003 Sinn Féin became the largest nationalist party in the Northern Irish 
assembly, overtaking their more moderate rivals, the SDLP. This moment 
symbolised a remarkable transformation for Sinn Féin as up until the close of the 
twentieth century, the party supported an Irish republican ‘armed struggle’ as a 
justifiable form of resistance to British rule in Northern Ireland. Despite the 
seismic shift of Sinn Féin, the opening quote from the party’s constitution and 
rules demonstrates how the party continues to project their objectives within 
the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. 
 
The role and position of Sinn Féin in the decades before the Northern Irish peace 
process has been described as ‘a fringe anti system protest organisation’ 
functioning as a ‘mouthpiece’ for, and subordinate to, the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA).2 Up until the mid 1980s, the prominence of armed struggle over political 
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participation placed Sinn Féin as an ‘auxiliary’ organisation to their armed 
counter-parts.3 Sinn Féin’s republicanism of the twenty-first century however, 
maintains a ‘wholly political focus.’4 Today, Sinn Féin bears many characteristics 
of a modern political party but they are unique in their past association with an 
armed organisation and lineage to a revolutionary tradition. Within global peace 
processes the path from revolutionary organisation to participating in 
established constitutional politics has been well trodden. Central to 
understanding conflict resolution and democratisation within a post-conflict 
context is the political transformation of groups away from an armed campaign 
towards constitutionalism. For groups to successfully make the transition to 
democratic parties they have to undergo re-structuring and develop more 
inclusive forms of internal governance.5 Hopkins suggests that whilst Sinn Féin 
has ‘maintained the veneer of an anti-system party’, where voters still continue 
to support the party on that basis, in reality it has been steadily institutionalised 
and incorporated in to the political mainstream.6  
 
Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish 
independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays 
host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the 
Easter Rising therefore provides a poignant moment to reassess republican 
politics, more specifically, the interaction between constitutionalism and an 
armed revolutionary tradition. The first section of this paper examines the 
broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into 
constitutional politics. Secondly, analysis of public opinion survey data is used to 
judge the basis of Sinn Féin’s electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents 
are used to examine Sinn Féin’s party structure, intra-party democracy and 
professionalisation in order to explore the extent to which Sinn Féin have 
adapted to post-peace process politics. Whilst acknowledging Sinn Féin’s all-
Ireland structure and political role in the Republic, analysis mainly focuses on 
electoral performance within the post-Good Friday Agreement (GFA) context in 
Northern Ireland. Due to Sinn Féin’s historical ties to paramilitarism and the 
party’s justification of armed struggle up until the turn of the twentieth century, 
examining the evolution of Sinn Féin also provides a unique contribution to the 
literature on how armed groups more broadly make the transition in to 
constitutional politics.   
Revolutionaries to constitutionalists 
 
There has been a growing amount of literature examining the evolution of armed 
groups into political parties within a post conflict arena.7 The transition from 
violent struggle to constitutionalism opens up the channels for political process 
engagement that is essential for sustainable peace, stability and democracy. 
Parties that gain greater political access through electoral success are more 
likely to support the post-conflict political settlement.8 Therefore, central to the 
promotion of this political path is the extent to which parties are electorally 
rewarded. The adaptation into a broad-based, catch-all party that moves beyond 
a traditional support-base is crucial to the success of any organisation previously 
supportive of an armed campaign.9  
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Groups making the transition from armed struggle to politics have to confront 
the demands of constitutionalism and adapt to the formal political process. 
Various factors impact the success of former ‘rebel’ groups ranging from the 
longevity and intensity of conflict,10 whether the group has been victorious or 
become the opposition11 and finally the nature of institutional arrangements 
such as the electoral system and dispersal of power.12      
 
A common tendency within ‘rebel groups’ is to be designed and organised in a 
way most conducive to conducting an irregular armed campaign requiring 
secrecy, clandestine operations, close-knit leadership group and hierarchical 
command structures.13 By contrast, executive power within political parties is 
typically less concentrated with more participatory and consensual decision-
making.14 The struggle between the militant group and civilian wings of a rebel 
organisation have an important impact on the way in which the political party 
organises.15 For example, de Zeeuw argues that if the leader and main party 
candidates took an active part in violence then the structure will be more 
centralised, since the organisation will be more likely to take on the structure of 
the rebel movement. 16  The continuation of a centralised structure may 
encourage a stable support base and disciplined party but the continuation of an 
autocratic and hierarchical leadership also poses a challenge to the 
democratisation of party organisation.  
 
Durable stability depends largely on whether former armed groups decide to 
adapt to, evade or exit the post-conflict political arena.17 Therefore, central to 
sustaining peace is for these parties to compete for power through ballots rather 
than bullets. Revolutionary organisations will have operated in different 
environments and emerged from different historical, institutional and political 
contexts, it is therefore necessary to chart the gradual shifts within Sinn Féin and 
the PIRA.  
Between bullets and ballots: Sinn Féin’s transition 
 
The three decades of ethno-conflict in Northern Ireland known as the ‘Troubles’ 
resulted in over 3,500 deaths.18 During the IRAs armed campaign (1969-2001), 
the IRA was responsible for almost half of these (1,735), the majority of targets 
being the police (Royal Ulster Constabulary) or British army personnel.19 There 
has been much academic attention accounting for the evolution and adaptation 
of Sinn Féin and the disbandment and eventual ‘disappearance’ of the PIRA. 
Explanations range from the un-winability of the IRAs war, the successful 
coercion and containment strategies of the British state and the frustration of the 
rank and file.20 
 
Undergoing various transformations and prone to organisational divisions, Sinn 
Féin has had a turbulent history, particularly over the relationship between 
armed struggle and politics. Up until the early 1980s Sinn Féin was described a 
‘political front’, which remained ‘subordinate to the terrorist organisation.’21 A 
change of tack was introduced during Sinn Féin’s 1981 Ard Fheis (annual party 
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conference), where the party’s director of publicity Danny Morrison, presented 
the dual strategy of ‘Armalite and ballot box’. From this moment politics was 
offered a far more equal role to the armed campaign, repositioning Sinn Féin 
away from being the subordinate ‘mouthpiece’ of the PIRA to partner.22 Electoral 
rewards soon followed. In the 1982 assembly election, Sinn Féin obtained 10 per 
cent of the vote, signifying a major breakthrough for the party. During the 1983 
Westminster elections the party won 13.4 per cent of the vote (43 per cent of 
nationalist vote) with Gerry Adams winning the West Belfast seat.23 By 1986, the 
role of politics prevailed further as the strategic decision was finally made at a 
party Ard-Fheis to drop abstention to the Republic of Ireland (Leinster House).  
 
Despite this early electoral success the party never succeeded in attracting the 
majority of Catholic support whilst the PIRA continued its campaign, albeit as a 
more equal partner. By the mid-1980s, Sinn Féin was only able to retain a core 
10-13 per cent of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland.24 Sinn Féin were to 
soon suffer several electoral setbacks losing 16 out of 59 council seats in 1989 
and Gerry Adams, now party President, being defeated in West Belfast during the 
1992 Westminster election. By the 1980s the PIRA were losing members, the 
British government were finding PIRA weapon caches and high civilian 
casualties tempered much of the sympathy the movement had.25 These political 
and military setbacks encouraged the party to develop a more sophisticated 
electoral strategy.26 
 
The 1990s witnessed two PIRA ceasefires as the organisation entered formal 
negotiations with the British government to end the conflict. During this period 
the legacy of revolutionary republicanism was used to reiterate Sinn Féin’s 
political message and justify continued involvement in the peace process. At the 
Easter Commemoration in 1997, the party's national chairperson Mitchel 
McLaughlin stated, ‘Sinn Féin will enter peace talks and finish the political task of 
the IRA's dead.’27 By 1998 Sinn Féin signed the GFA, agreeing to enter a power 
sharing Assembly and in 2005 the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning declared that ‘the IRA has destroyed all its arms’.28 The former 
days of the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy were replaced with just the ballot 
box. By the end of the twentieth century the shift away from an armed campaign 
to full absorption in to constitutionalism went too far for some in abandoning 
republican principles, leading to splits within the movement.  
 
During the Troubles, significant splits occurred on several occasions, leading to 
the formation of disparate ‘dissident’ republican groups. The dropping of 
abstention to Dáil Éireann in 1986, was for some tantamount to an ‘act of 
treason’, and lead to the creation of Republican Sinn Féin and the Continuity 
IRA.29 A decade later saw the emergence of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement 
(32CSM) and the Real IRA, who disagreed with the direction of the peace 
process, particularly the Mitchell Principles of non-violence and the 
downgrading of armed struggle. The legacy of 1916 plays a crucial role for 
‘dissident’ groups in justifying their opposition to the peace process, whilst 
simultaneously discrediting Sinn Féin’s republican credentials; 
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The republic was claimed in 1916 as an all Ireland Republic, a 32 county 
Republic…The British chose to ignore the democratic wish of Irish 
people…anybody that accepts the status quo at the minute is not a 
republican because i.e. they do not support the Republic. They support the 
Irish Free State or whatever they want to call it now, they support the Six 
County state and to be honest with you they’re backing the British in 
Ireland by backing the peace process and to me that’s not an actual 
republican.30 
 
As well as delegitimising the position of Sinn Féin on a political level, the legacy 
of the Easter Rising is also used by dissidents to justify the continuation of armed 
struggle, despite the lack of popular support; 
 
The leaders of 1916, they were spat on by the people of Dublin as they 
were marched through the streets with Dublin’s people waving Union Jacks 
in their face…the IRA is always legitimate as long as there is a British 
occupation in this country.31 
 
Recollecting the past enables events such as 1916 to transcend time. Memorials, 
commemorations and martyrdom are reconstructed across the broad republican 
spectrum to justify opposing positions, be it an unwavering alignment to armed 
struggle, or, in Sinn Féin’s case, a full commitment to constitutional politics. 
 
Despite divisions occurring, via the leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness, Sinn Féin had made the slow, yet seismic, transition to eventually 
become the main nationalist political force in Northern Ireland. The willingness 
and ability of the party to modify its strategy to such an extent meant that by 
2007 the party was ‘virtually unrecognisable’ from its form in the early 1980s.32 
As long as the PIRA was still active there was a ceiling to Sinn Féin’s electoral 
success. With the PIRA ‘leaving the scene’, Sinn Féin were rewarded electorally, 
therefore supporting the post-GFA dispensation proved a ‘logical political step.’33 
The success of Sinn Féin reflects the party’s progression towards being viewed 
as a purely political force with broader electoral appeal.  
The ‘rules of the game’: Sinn Féin as the largest nationalist 
party 
 
The centrality of revolutionary armed struggle in the early 1970s, to the dual 
strategy of ‘armalite and ballot box’ in the 1980s lead on to the gradual decline of 
the PIRA as the military wing of the republican movement. By 2003 Sinn Féin 
had become the largest nationalist party in the Assembly and by 2011 they 
gained 26.2 per cent of the vote share in Northern Ireland, 10 per cent clear of 
their nationalist rivals, the SDLP.34 Despite the compromises made by the party, 
and suffering several organisational splits, Sinn Féin were now favoured by the 
majority of nationalists in Northern Ireland.35   
 
Party strategy and organisation is dependent on numerous variables within the 
post-conflict environment, one of those being the institutional framework. It is 
 6 
therefore necessary to assess the political context within which Sinn Féin 
operates and how the ‘rules of the game’ within the post GFA context have 
impacted party politics. Drawing upon recent public opinion survey data from 
the General Election Survey (2015), this section will also highlight the electoral 
appeal of the party as the basis of Sinn Féin strategy.   
 
The GFA installed consociational principles to create a Northern Ireland 
Assembly dominated by a power-sharing executive and subject to voting 
mechanisms that require cross-community consent.36 Within Northern Irish 
politics ethnicity and identify remain the dominant political cleavages. For 
example, in the 2015 General Election only 3.8 per cent of those identifying as 
nationalists voted outside the nationalist party bloc.37 In the same survey, only 
5.5 per cent of nationalists were very likely to transfer their lower preference 
vote to a unionist candidate in future elections.38 Therefore ethnic identities in 
Northern Ireland are described as ‘inflexible, resilient, crystallised and hard.’39  
 
A tendency of consociational systems of democracy is the impulse towards 
ethnic outbidding, a process through which parties within the same ethno-
national bloc strive to portray themselves as ‘the true defenders’ of the groups 
position and interests whilst simultaneously ‘undercutting the position of in-
group rivals.’40 The claims and counter-claims from intra-group rivalry may 
resemble an ‘ethnic auction’ as the parties throw accusations of treachery and 
betrayal in order to bid for dominance within their ethno-national block.41 
 
Within post-conflict contexts groups will attempt to defend their cause. The 
negotiations that accompany any peace process are likely to antagonise 
sensitivities where concessions may be interpreted as weakness.42 The result 
being a zero-sum language that emphasises mono-ethnic identities by engaging 
in emotive ethnic appeals suggesting their group’s vital interests are in danger of 
being sold out and they are best placed to protect these concerns.43 The 
following from Sinn Féin’s 1998 Six County manifesto being a typical example of 
such discourse; 
 
‘…the days of unionist intransigence and obstruction are not over. There is 
much work ahead if we are to deliver change in this transitional phase. Sinn 
Féin intends to push the Good Friday Agreement to its outer limits and 
beyond.’44 
 
Within bloc competition may develop a centrifugal dynamic as voters are more 
likely to switch from the moderate, to supposedly, more extreme parties due to 
the perception they are more effective in voicing the concerns of their 
community.45 Within the post-conflict politics the DUP and Sinn Féin quickly 
established themselves as the largest parties within the opposing blocs at the 
expense of the more moderate UUP and the SDLP.  
 
Mitchell et al, have labelled Sinn Féin as an ‘ethnic tribune’ party, pragmatic in 
terms of seeking resources and institutional incentives yet simultaneously 
intransigent with regards to identity and the tendency to ‘reinforce an ‘ethnic 
tribune appeal.’’46 A position supported by voters within the constitutional 
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sphere, not through political violence. With the Provisional IRA ceasefires of the 
1990s and eventual disbandment in 2005, Sinn Féin could ‘reap the rewards of 
purportedly driving the best bargains possible for nationalists within a 
consociational power-sharing framework.’47  
 
Eighteen years on from the GFA and perceptions of Catholic inequality amongst 
the nationalist community have not diminished; survey evidence suggests the 
contrary. When asked in 2010 about the levels of discrimination, 55.4 per cent of 
nationalists identified the continued existence of prejudice against Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. By 2015, this had increased to 64.2 per cent. As a result, 
political parties can continue to play on the perception of communal inequality 
in gaining electoral appeal; a position that continues to benefit Sinn Féin over 
their more moderate rival. In the 2015, 70.7 per cent of Catholics were of the 
opinion that Sinn Féin had been ‘the most effective voice for nationalists in 
Northern Ireland’, whilst only 11.3 per cent believing the SDLP had been more 
effective.48 This is a rise by almost 10 per cent for Sinn Féin since the 2010 
general election.49  
 
It is not inevitable that all ‘ethnic tribune’ parties ‘win’ from consociational 
power sharing.50 Research from other post conflict contexts argue that the 
degree of success in the long term depends on the ability of ethnic parties to 
simultaneously address grievances of their own ethnic groups and proving 
robust on issues by not accepting concessions and identify appropriate frames, 
strategies and institutional opportunities which involves moderating stances on 
issues that may be less salient to their group.51 Ultimately, long-term success is 
compromised by  ‘ethnic tribune’ parties ‘unwilling to adapt and moderate their 
positions to the new political or institutional opportunities.’52  Embracing 
constitutionalism has made Sinn Féin susceptible to the pressures experienced 
by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and 
driven by office seeking priorities.  
 
Understanding politics in Northern Ireland purely on the basis of ‘ethnic 
outbidding’ overlooks the extent to which these parties have modernised and 
moderated their agendas. Whilst Sinn Féin acknowledges traditional republican 
goals they do so within modern democratic principles of justice, democracy, 
equality and peace. Sinn Féin have adapted to the ‘rules of the game’ and have 
been rewarded electorally for doing so. Therefore, it is also necessary to consider 
Sinn Féin within the framework of being a ‘normal’ political party, subject to 
electoral logic and constitutional restraints.  
‘The players’: Sinn Féin as a ‘normal’ political party?  
 
Much of the literature on post-conflict state building has focused more on the 
design of the game and enforcement of rules rather than the players 
themselves.53 The ability of political parties to adapt and evolve is central to their 
survival. Sinn Féin has not been immune to the pressures explaining the long-
term evolution of many contemporary European political parties such as 
 8 
ideological adaptation, professionalisation and the removal of unpopular 
linkages.54  
 
There has been little attention on how Sinn Féin have adapted and modernised 
within the post-GFA context, an issue made particularly pertinent given past 
associations with the PIRA have provided the party ‘with an added dimension, 
unique among all mainstream political parties in Ireland, north or south of the 
border.’55 This section explores how the internal features and external political 
context interact to influence intra-party dynamics within Sinn Féin. By focusing 
on the removal of unpopular connection, party strategy, organisational structure 
(centralisation and intra-party authority), professionalisation and support for 
more progressive politics (gay rights, gender equality) this analysis will consider 
to what extent Sinn Féin fits in to the broader discussion of political party 
adaptation and modernisation. 
 
Removal of unpopular linkages: divorcing the military from the political 
 
The transformation of a rebel organisation into a political party is a critical 
component of successful post-conflict peace and democratisation.56 A key 
challenge facing a group that formally supported an armed campaign making the 
shift in to constitutionalism is the necessary transformation of internal power 
configurations and the accompanying organisational restructuring. 
Organisational demands are very different when the purpose is military 
operations as compared to campaigning for elections.57 
 
In many instances former combatants face the challenges presented to any new 
political party; devising a new political platform, raising campaign funds, 
creating a full time and professional organization and devising procedures to 
select leaders and candidates.58 However, political parties with roots in, or 
connections to, armed revolutionary groups are not ‘new organisations’, they 
may have histories dating back several decades to political parties, unions and 
protest groups. Further still, they have an organizational legacy, this may be a 
loose coalition among desperate groups brought together by a mutual enemy or 
that of a tightly knit organisation.59 Within a post-conflict context a key challenge 
is the transformation of internal power configurations and the accompanying 
organizational restructuring.       
 
The political success of Sinn Féin has relied on the party emancipating itself from 
its alter ego of many years, replacing revolutionary tactics for reform within the 
established political apparatus.60 For many, the sum of the Sinn Féin’s transition 
has resulted in the party’s ultimate objective of self-determination and territorial 
sovereignty being relegated to vague aspiration; replacing the ‘old teleological 
certainties of revolutionary struggle for the 32-county socialist republic with the 
deliberate ambiguity of an indefinite process.’61 The language of equality and 
pluralism replaced the rhetoric of Irish freedom and armed resistance.62  
 
Whilst the political discourse of Sinn Féin has shifted, developments following 
the murder of Kevin McGuigan in 2015 suggest that the organisational structures 
of the movement have not evolved in line with the party’s rhetoric. 
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Investigations in to McGuigan’s death lead to allegations by the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) ‘that a line of inquiry in relation to the murder of Kevin 
McGuigan, involved members of the PIRA.’63 Subsequently, an independent 
report on paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland concluded in October 2015 
that the PIRA and the paramilitary organisation’s decision-making body, the 
Army Council, continue to oversee both the PIRA and Sinn Féin with an 
overarching strategy’, albeit with ‘a wholly political focus’.64 Considering the 
PIRA were supposed to have decommissioned and ‘left the stage’ in 2005, 
unionist parties demonstrated their unwillingness to engage politically with Sinn 
Féin by leaving the Northern Irish executive. Such developments, which have 
highlighted the continued existence of paramilitary structures in Northern 
Ireland, have therefore been harmful to political progress, co-operation and 
community relations, and raises many broader questions in relation to the 
structure, role and purpose of paramilitary groups moving in to a new era of 
post-conflict politics.  
 
Events following the death of Kevin McGuigan may have formally recognised the 
continued links between Sinn Féin and the Provisional Army Council, yet the 
party itself is accused of maintaining an internal party culture and structure that 
is reflective of the organisations revolutionary tradition. For some, the 
development of Sinn Féin from a clandestine and revolutionary movement, has 
resulted in the party inheriting an ‘authoritarian political culture, both in terms 
of its internal organisation, and its relationship to the mainstream pro-system 
parties.’65 Even within the ‘supposedly more open and democratic politics of the 
peace process’, it is argued that the internal politics of control exercised by the 
leadership has strengthened.66 
 
The ability of political parties to adapt and respond to the changing political 
context is key to their survival. Such processes involve party restructuring, 
professionalisation, ideological adaptation, and the removal of unpopular 
linkages, in this case the PIRA. The removal of unpopular associations has been 
vital to the electoral success of Sinn Féin. Yet, the process of removing the PIRA 
and placing Sinn Féin’s politics at centre stage has demanded internal party 
cohesion. The workings of Sinn Féin has lead to comparisons between the party 
and ‘Stalin-esq’ authoritarianism67 where a Soviet style command structure 
positions a Big Brother type figure at the top of the organisation.68 Whilst the 
PIRA from the era of the Troubles is far beyond recall, the continued existence of 
a command structure has enabled greater discipline and cohesion during the 
party’s transition.  
 
It is not necessarily just the internal politics and mechanisms of the party that is 
reflective of a revolutionary past, Sinn Féin have managed to retain a façade of an 
anti system party. O’Malley proposes that such an anti-establishment position 
‘might be attractive to the type of voter who in another country, with a different 
nationalist past, might support a radical right-wing party.’69 Sinn Féin retains 
features of an anti-establishment party by continuing to abstain from 
Westminster, refusing to recognise ‘Northern Ireland’ in internal documents 
whilst within the party’s constitution, number one on the list of objectives is to 
‘End British rule in Ireland’.70 Such positions are juxtaposed to party leaders 
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shaking hands with members of the Royal Family and attending events hosted by 
the Head of State.  
Adoption of a ‘catch all’ strategy 
 
It has been acknowledged within various post-civil war contexts that peace 
duration depends heavily on how former rebel groups decide to engage with the 
post-war political arena. 71  Furthermore, examining electoral support base 
provides some insight as to whether these parties have reached out beyond the 
constituencies that supported them during the conflict. The establishment of 
broad-based, integrative parties that move beyond particular constituencies 
(geographic or otherwise) is crucial to the promotion of peace and democracy.72 
Therefore, whilst electoral progress is a key aspect of party adaptation, the 
adoption of a ‘catch all’ strategy designed to attract a mass base of support for 
the party is also crucial.  
 
An important aspect in determining how groups interact with the political 
process is how former rebel parties perform in electoral contests, particularly in 
the first election following the cessation of hostilities.73 In the first assembly 
election after the GFA the moderate nationalist and unionist parties, the SDLP 
and UUP, were rewarded for their facilitatory roles in the peace process by 
becoming the largest parties within their respective ethno-national blocs. 
However, Sinn Féin polled only 4 per cent below the SDLP, signifying a positive 
electoral trajectory. By 2003 Sinn Féin became the dominant voice of Northern 
nationalists. The party also emphasises its all-Ireland structure in facilitating the 
capture of 14 seats in 2011 general election in the Republic of Ireland, the party’s 
highest since 1923.74  
 
Within modern liberal democracies parties have been rewarded for moving 
towards the centre ground away from ethnically-based platforms. However, in 
Northern Ireland it seems as though the reverse has occurred where more 
extreme parties (Sinn Féin and the DUP) have been the benefactors. Exploring 
other post-conflict contexts, Manning suggests that of particular importance to 
party strategy is whether the electoral appeals used during the conflict remain 
both available and effective in the ‘new’ political arena.75 Sinn Féin’s electoral 
growth in Northern Ireland has not occurred by attracting protestant-unionist 
backing. In the 2011 assembly election, only 10 per cent of unionists straddled 
the communal divide with a lower preference vote for a nationalist candidate, 
whilst only 20 per cent of nationalist voters crossed to ‘enemy lines’ with their 
lower preferences. 76  Ethno-national cleavages still dominate political 
preferences in Northern Ireland and show little sign of thawing.  
 
Emphasising Sinn Féin’s lack of cross-community electoral appeal ignores the 
moderation the party has gone through, the result being the broadening of 
support amongst the nationalist community. Sinn Féin are traditionally 
perceived as a party of the Catholic working class, whilst the SDLP were 
dominant amongst the middle classes.77 Research by Evans and Tonge identifies 
how Sinn Féin have been successful in attracting previous non voters and new 
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voters as well as middle-class nationalists who were happy to transfer their 
support to Sinn Féin to consolidate the party’s constitutionalism.78  
 
Sinn Féin have de-ghettoised to create broader appeal, the result being that 
‘post-IRA republicans could - conceivably – enjoy not merely the rewards of 
prisoner release or northern police reform but, ultimately, the prospect of being 
in coalition government both in Belfast and Dublin.’79 Whilst the party’s political 
strategy does not provide any guarantees of securing the ultimate goal of a 
united Ireland, the movement is nearer to this than it ‘had been getting through 
the use of violence.’80 A catch ‘all’ strategy exists for Sinn Féin in so far as the 
party has broadened its appeal within the nationalist bloc, rather than widening 
their electoral support base in order to cut across the communal divide; a 
strategy that has been described as ‘catch-self’ rather than ‘catch-all’.81 
 
Centralisation of party structure 
 
The centralisation of power refers to ‘the location and distribution of effective 
decision-making authority within the party.’82 The general trend within a 
modernised party structure is to cede more power to members in a formal sense. 
Simultaneously however, parties become increasingly top down, with party 
members marginalised beyond formal voting rights.83 Therefore, political parties 
have become more susceptible to leadership control.84 
 
The structure and discipline of Sinn Féin has earned them the reputation of being 
‘run of Bolshevik lines with a politburo type leadership enforced with army style 
discipline.’85 Such perspectives tend to emphasise the unwavering position of the 
party leadership. Adopting a more grass roots perspective, Maillot suggests that 
‘Sinn Féin’s greatest asset is undoubtedly the fact that it is first and foremost a 
party of activists’, emphasising also a bottom-up aspect to decision making 
structures and processes. However, at the same time the party is driven by a 
strong leadership relying on a ‘handful of personalities who seem to have the 
trust of the overwhelming majority of its members.’86 Therefore, leadership 
driven or bottom-up processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. An 
argument also expressed by Bean, who stresses that both ‘consent and coercion’ 
defines the relationship between Sinn Féin and the nationalist community.87  
 
In terms of party structure Sinn Féin is based on a decentralised network of 
Cumann (branches). Any changes to the party constitution and rules have to be 
voted on with a two-thirds majority at the party’s annual conference (where all 
present party members have a vote).88 However, it has been noted that disparity 
exists between formal structures and actual intra-organisational reality, due to ‘a 
combination of the work of the Ard-Chomhairle (National Executive), party 
loyalty and residual paramilitary links ensure that Sinn Féin is an organisation 
with a strong leadership authority.’89 
 
During the peace process votes were taken on key strategic issues such as 
dropping abstention to the Republic (1986), the terms of GFA (1998) and 
support for policing (2007). Rather than being an exercise of intra-party 
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democracy and grass root consultation, such processes have been described as 
the management of opposition as opposed to encouraging debate.90 Also, 
Moloney suggests that the transition away from armed struggle from the 1980s 
onwards was very much a top-down process. The leadership figures of Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuinness were the key protagonists in constructing an 
electoral profile for Sinn Féin, selling the peace process to the grass-roots as a 
‘tactical ploy’ to seek political gains rather than it being a long term strategy.91 
Therefore, key to understanding centralisation within Sinn Féin is to explore the 
role and position of party leadership. 
Intra-party authority 
 
Intra-party democracy of a political organisation is reflective in the internal 
distribution of power. Criticism in recent years has been leveled at parties for 
being over-hierarchical, particularly in relation to the role of the leadership.92 In 
stressing the ‘presidentialization of politics’, Poguntke and Webb argue that 
leaders have become more influential in nearly every aspect of party decision-
making.93 The choices made by parties in terms of how their leaders are 
recruited and removed is revealing of their democratic ethos.94 It is therefore, 
necessary to question, who selects the leader? How competitive are leadership 
contests? And how and when do leaders terms come to an end? 
 
In Sinn Féin, the party President is part of a 19 strong leadership team (Ard 
Chomhairle) which includes an officer board95and 12 other members, elected at 
the annual party conference (Ard Fheis).96 Whilst there are no term limits in 
place for the Sinn Féin Presidency there are provisions for annual (re)election as 
the officer board and members that make up the Ard Chomhairle are voted for at 
the party’s Ard Fheis.97 It is possible for any party member to contest the 
position of leader, providing they have the endorsement from one internal body. 
The annual re-election of party leadership and the provision for challenges to the 
President are both aspects that encourage membership inclusivity and 
leadership accountability.  
 
The current Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, has been party President since 1983. 
Research on party leaders in several democratic states in the latter half of the 
twentieth century report a mean tenure of 75 months98 with only one in four 
able to boast a leadership of more than 10 years.99 It is therefore extraordinary 
that the current President of Sinn Féin has remained in place for over three 
decades.  
 
In understanding such longevity it is essential to firstly acknowledge the role of 
Adams in the peace process, replacing armed struggle with a political agenda, 
was largely driven by the Northern leadership, with Adams at the helm. 
Therefore, the transformation and electoral success of the party is seen by many 
as Adams’ legacy.100 A leading position bolstered during the peace process by the 
external recognition awarded to Adams by international figures such as 
President Clinton and Nelson Mandela. Clinton’s decision to approve a visa to the 
US in 1994 awarded Adams legitimacy as a credible political actor; a stark 
comparison with the UK government who continued to impose a broadcasting 
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ban on Sinn Féin representatives until the end of 1994. In addition, a visiting 
ANC (African National Congress) delegation to Belfast in 1998 described Adams 
as an Irish Mandela and referred to the Sinn Féin leader as ‘Mr President’.101 
Sharing a platform with the ANC gave the Sinn Féin leadership the opportunity to 
bask in some of Mandela’s international adulation as a strong party leader and a 
central figure to the South African peace process.102 A comparison built upon by 
Sinn Féin within a post-peace process context. In May 2014 Adams’ was arrested 
and questioned in relation to the 1972 murder of Jean McConville. In front of a 
20 foot mural of the Sinn Féin President in Belfast, protestors held posters with a 
photograph of Adams alongside Mandela and the statement, ‘Defend the peace 
process: release Gerry Adams’.103 Even during a period that had the potential to 
undermine any political leaders position, party supporters presented the peace 
process and Gerry Adams as synonymous.   
 
Secondly, the Sinn Féin leader is elected as part of a wider leadership team. 
Throughout the peace process whilst Adams was party leader, it has been 
commented that Martin McGuinness was as much a figurehead.104 Within post- 
GFA politics, McGuinnness’ position as Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland 
and Adams’ as a TD in the Republic means they are de facto seen as the party 
leaders within the separate jurisdictions. It has been commented that the 
‘collective’ nature of such leadership is protective in nature, as it is difficult to 
isolate any one individual for criticism.105 Sinn Féin has not been immune to 
internal tension. Whilst numerous splits within the republican movement 
occurred in the decades leading up to the peace process this also meant that by 
1998 intra-elite rivalry was minimised. 
 
Thirdly, political parties change, re-organise and modernize as a result of 
electoral defeat.106 Such adaptation will often involve a change of leadership. 
With electoral growth and the comparative decline of their intra-ethnic bloc 
opposition, the SDLP, Sinn Féin has not experienced electoral defeat as a 
stimulus for change. Since the first Assembly election after the GFA, the SDLP 
have lost nearly 8 per cent of their vote share whilst Sinn Féin’s has increased by 
almost 9 per cent.107 In addition, the SDLP have had three different leaders since 
they were surpassed by Sinn Féin as the largest nationalist party in 2003. The 
electoral preference for Sinn Féin over their nationalist rivals is also reflected in 
public opinion of party leadership. In the 2015 General Election Survey 
respondents were asked to rate all political leaders on a ten-point scale (0-low, 
10-high). Amongst nationalists, 26.7 per cent gave the current SDLP leader 
Alistair McDonnell a rating of 7 or more. The rating on the same scale for Martin 
McGuinness on the other hand was over double that of McDonnell (54.2 per 
cent), the highest assessment across the largest four party leaders within their 
respective ethno-national blocs.108 
 
Whilst Sinn Féin’s structure is likened to that of a revolutionary organisation the 
hierarchy and leadership of other mainstream parties in Northern Ireland are 
also reflective of their history, formation and organisational connections. For 
example, Moloney and Pollock have criticised the ‘monolithic pattern of 
behaviour’ within the DUP, and likened the party to what exists in ‘totalitarian 
regimes or military dictatorships.’109 In terms of leadership, the DUP have been 
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accused of reflecting religious associations in the party’s organisation, mainly in 
their respect and admiration for a single leadership figure; ‘both the Free 
Presbyterian Church and the DUP have turned out to be antitheses of democracy 
– institutions whose common characteristic is worship of and obedience to one 
man.’110  
 
Like Sinn Féin, the DUP have also moderated their position. Strong leadership 
has been central to cohesion and electoral success as parties adapt to the post-
conflict politics. Whilst Sinn Féin’s party structure is critiqued for being ‘cult-like’ 
and intolerant for internal debate, such characteristics are accredited to 
maintaining party cohesion and minimising division.  
 
Professionalisation and party strategy 
 
Another element is consider is the professionalisation of party strategy and 
campaigning tools, including how the party selects prospective representatives. 
In addition, the ‘professional electoral party’ relies heavily on media and public 
relations experts, pollsters, political advisors and image consultants.111 For 
some, the everyday organisation and political performance of Sinn Féin is the 
epitome of post-modern politics where the ‘skilful manipulation of the media, the 
importance of personalities at local and national level, the constant redefinition 
of its core ideology and its increasingly post republican politics’ resembles Tony 
Blair’s New Labour.112 In terms of party image Sinn Féin is able to tailor their 
political messaging for the separate jurisdictions. In the Republic, Sinn Féin are 
able to present themselves as offering something different and as the protectors 
against austerity, in the North the party continue to defend a minority Catholic 
community. A position summed up in Sinn Féin’s Six County Report and 
Financial Statement:  
 
Throughout 2013 Sinn Féin continued to lead by example in the Executive 
in the north and as the main opposition party in the south. We worked to 
advance the peace process, continued to prioritise investment in job 
creation and set out real alternatives to the policies of austerity from 
Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party.113 
 
Crucial to presenting an image of a united and cohesive party is selecting the 
right candidates. Sinn Féin is a well-regimented party where the rare dissenting 
voices have been marginalised.114 Electoral politics requires a different set of 
skills than those demanded in wartime. The transition from military 
confrontation may change the sources of organisational power and authority in 
attempt to professionalise the party. One clear example of this is the need to 
identify, recruit, and retain a large number of suitable candidates for public 
office, who are both competent and loyal to the organization’s cause.115 
Therefore, revolutionary groups adapt their organisational routines and modify 
recruiting procedures ‘to carry out a revised set of vital organisational 
functions.’116  
 
The way in which parties select candidates acts as an ‘acid test’ of how 
 15 
democratic their internal affairs are.117 Firstly, candidate selection is important 
in reflecting the type and quality of party representatives. Selection procedures 
are influential in determining the ‘representativeness’ of minorities, particularly 
in relation to gender equality and ethnic minorities.118 The more centralised 
candidate selection the better the prospects for greater minority representation.  
Secondly, selection methods also influence the nature of party discipline and 
loyalty. The more centralised and exclusive the process of selection, the more 
likely a candidate is to have greater loyalty to the party’s ideological stance and 
policy direction.119 Processes that are more democratic, inclusive and localised, 
are more likely to result in non-disciplined and individualistic candidates.120 
Therefore, party cohesiveness and parliamentary efficiency is much more likely 
with a centralised candidate selection process.  
 
Sinn Féin carries out a multi-stage selection process for prospective 
candidates.121 Any member, who has been in the party for at least 12 months, can 
put their names forward (although in exceptional circumstances Ard Chomhairle 
may approve the election of probationary members). The responsibility for 
conducting elections lies at local level with the relevant Comhairle Cuige 
(Regional Executive) where candidates are selected via secret ballot by full party 
members within the relevant constituency. Whilst it is the responsibility of the 
regional body to summon a selection convention, representing a localised 
selection process, the guidelines are subject to instruction from Ard Chomhairle. 
In addition, following selection by secret ballot, candidates have to be ratified by 
the national executive.122 Sinn Féin candidates in all regional and parliamentary 
elections have to sign a pledge agreeing to be amenable to all directions and 
instructions issued by the national executive and agree to resign their seats if 
called upon by the majority of An Ard Chomhairle.123 Sinn Féin is not an 
exception in having candidates make such pledges.124  Candidates for the 
Westminster elections also agree to not sit in, take part in, the proceedings of the 
Westminster parliament.125  
 
Research by Matthews in to the dynamics of candidate selection and gender 
representation highlights the willingness within Sinn Féin’s central office to 
interfere with the selection process in order to address gender inequality.126 
Whilst central party control is used to encourage minority representation, the 
use of such measures also indicates a substantial degree of centralised 
involvement over candidate selection in comparison to rivals in Northern Ireland 
and other contemporary British and Irish parties.127 In terms of intra-party 
democracy and power-dynamics ‘central interference suggests a high level of 
compliance or subservience amongst Sinn Féin members.’128  
 
A ‘new’ politics? 
 
The main political cleavage in Northern Ireland remains based on ethno-national 
identity meaning equality is primarily viewed as between communities, rather 
than alternative forms of identification such as gender, race or sexuality.129 Yet, 
viewing Sinn Féin as an ‘ethnic tribune party’ emphasises the exploitation of 
ancient fault-lines above addressing new issue agendas. Whilst remaining 
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intransigent on issues surrounding identity Sinn Féin have been more reactive in 
relation to certain socio-political issues. 
 
Sinn Féin has the most balanced gender representation in the Northern Irish 
Assembly and is the most pro-active in ensuring gender equality of Northern 
Ireland’s main parties. Sinn Féin has also been supportive of LGBT rights, 
backing the referendum on the Marriage Bill (2015) in the Republic, allowing 
same sex couples equal marriage rights, and pushing for a similar campaign in 
Northern Ireland. 130 Asking Northern Irish voters in 2015 whether they 
supported the legalisation of gay marriage, Sinn Féin supporters were more 
likely to strongly agree/agree (77 per cent) than any other party (SDLP, 60.7 per 
cent).131 Whilst more progressive on LGBT rights, issues such as the legalisation 
of abortion still remain contentious for the party and their support base.132 
There are certain policy perspectives where Sinn Féin is willing to follow public 
opinion (female representation, gay marriage), however shifts on other issues 
(reproductive rights) are unlikely to yield sufficient shifts in popular support.133 
It is not inevitable certain parties will ‘win’ from consociational power-sharing. 
Whilst remaining robust on issues surrounding identity, Sinn Féin have 
recognised certain socio-political issues on which they can draw support. Sinn 
Féin therefore represents a responsive political movement rather than a party 
restricted by ancient fault-lines.   
Conclusion 
 
Whilst there is clearly no prescriptive framework of a ‘normal’ political party, 
exploring ideological adaptation, party strategy and intra-party democracy 
highlights how Sinn Féin have responded to the pressures of mainstream 
constitutional politics. The party has demonstrated an ability for statecraft, 
broadened their support-base, professionalised and shown governing 
competence. Whilst Sinn Féin have moderated and adapted their agenda 
considerably, remaining features of a revolutionary past such as central control 
and party discipline remain in tact. The true extent of paramilitary command 
structures still in existence in Northern Ireland today have been under-valued 
and as a consequence had a negative impact on political co-operation in the 
region. Yet, it is unlikely that Sinn Féin would have been able to make such a 
profound transition from bullets to the ballot box without the intra-
organisational structures that have delivered effective party management. 
Appreciating the history and roots of Sinn Féin as an auxiliary to the PIRA 
remains important to understanding the discipline and loyalty that remains 
within the party. Despite the GFA, joint membership of the PIRA and Sinn Féin 
remained a feature well in to the twenty-first century, particularly at leadership 
level. Tight organisational structure instilled loyalty and discipline in the ranks 
of the PIRA and the same has gone for Sinn Féin in its loyalty to the party’s 
leadership. Despite the existence of dissident groups who splinted from Sinn 
Féin’s version of republicanism, such factions are small and demonstrate little 
challenge to the party’s electoral prospects.  
 
The centenary of the Easter Rising and devolved assembly elections in 2016 
 17 
provide a contemporary demonstration of an enduring fault-line within Irish 
republicanism. Throughout the past century Irish republicans have used the 
legacy of the Easter Rising, and the martyrs it created, to justify violence and self-
sacrifice. One hundred years later, under the banner ‘Revolution 1916’, Sinn Féin 
plan a range of national events to ‘remember and honour those who rose in 
rebellion but, more importantly, let us complete their work.’134 Whilst building 
on a revolutionary past, completing this ‘work’ in the future will be down to Sinn 
Féin’s tactics and strategy within the constitutional sphere. 
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